1. Either (a) the purposes God sets for our lives are significant because God wills them, or (b) God wills them because they're significant.
2. If (a), then what counts as a significant life is arbitrary.
3. If (b), then what counts as a significant life is independent of God
4. Therefore, what counts as a significant life is either arbitrary or independent of God.
Thanks to Justin Schieber for remarks that got me thinking about this.
Schellenberg, J.L. "A New Logical Problem of Evil", in McBrayer, Justin & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Companion to the Problem of Evil (Blackwell, forthcoming).
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